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The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women's Status:
An Examination of Marriage Laws in Egypt,
South Africa, and the United States
Brenda Oppermann*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the rule of law becomes muddied when a government
recognizes more than one body of law. Nowhere is this more apparent than
in legally pluralistic countries where traditional law' and national law2 exist
side by side. Because these bodies of law grew out of culturally distinct
customs and practices, their coexistence frequently results in conflict. The
implications of conflicts between traditional and national law are
particularly serious for women since, in many countries, women's rights -
particularly in the context of traditional law - are often subordinate to
those of men. Cultural norms reflecting male values and interests permeate
traditional or indigenous law regulating family issues and resulting in the
legal supremacy of male interests over female interests. This is particularly
evident with respect to marriage laws.
"It has been said that marital rights enjoyed by women in their culture
and religion are often a good indicator of women's status in society at
large."3 This essay examines the impact of legal pluralism with regard to
the laws of marriage on the status of women in Egypt, South Africa, and
the United States. While the type of traditional law in each country is
different (e.g., Egypt acknowledges religious law (such as Shari'a),
J.D., 2004, Western New England College School of Law; M.A., 1994, Yale
University; B.A., 1985, University of California, Irvine. I would like to thank all of the
people who provided assistance with my article, including Professors Art Wolf, Beth Cohen,
and Valerie Vojdik. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their steadfast
support throughout my many and assorted endeavors both academic and personal.
1. For the purposes of this essay, traditional law refers to bodies of law that emanate
from indigenous custom and practices or religion.
2. For the purposes of this essay, national law refers to law derived from legislatures,
courts, and judges. Depending on the country, it may also be referred to, inter alia, as civil,
public, or state law.
3. Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts:
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 189, 194 (2002).
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customary law is recognized in South Africa, and Indian tribal law is
sanctioned in the United States), these legal orders all share common
characteristics in that they are closely related to custom, societal norms,
and accepted standards of behavior. Consequently, in many situations
traditional law reflects a bias against women in their roles as wives,
mothers, and daughters.
Finally, this essay submits that legal pluralism alone does not
necessarily disadvantage women. Rather, recognizing and applying
traditional law that discriminates against women4 serves as a detriment to
women in their daily lives and, further, weakens their overall status. On
the other hand, traditional law can and should be applied because it reflects
international human rights and the international standards for equality
between men and women.5 In fact, a dual legal system that embodies these
values can actually improve women's status. Since in many countries
traditional law is often the only form of law known to many people,
particularly those living in nonurban areas, allowing this body of law to
continue to operate in accordance with international standards of equity,
vis-d-vis women, can help to disseminate and eventually ensconce the
concept of gender equity.
II. LEGAL PLURALISM
Traditional legal anthropology views legal pluralism as a system of
different legal orders, conceived of as separate entities, coexisting in the
same political space.6 It consists of different bodies of law that form part
of the state legal system.7 In a sense, legal pluralism also represents the
4. Traditional law might also be considered discriminatory towards men, but the
scope of this essay is limited to the effect of traditional law on the status of women.
5. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) has been described as the "definitive international legal instrument
requiring respect for the observance of the human rights of women .. " Rebecca Cook,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643 (1990). CEDAW Article 16 clearly addresses the nature
and structure of marriage, requiring, among other provisions, that there must be full equality
between spouses during the marriage. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within:
Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 483, 499 (2002). Both South Africa and Egypt have ratified CEDAW, but the
U.S. has failed to follow suit. South Africa ratified CEDAW without qualifications in 1995.
Egypt ratified CEDAW with qualifications in 1981. Egypt's reservation to Article 2 of the
Convention reads: "The Arab Republic of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of
this Article, provided it does not run counter to Islamic Shari'ah." Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the
Veil?: An Analysis of the Provision of the Women 's Convention in the Law as Stipulated in
Shari'ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1, n. 15 (1995) (quoting Multi-Lateral Treaties Deposited with
the Secretary General, General status as of 31 December 1991, U.N. Doc,
ST/LEG/SER.E/10 (1991)). Egypt's reservation, like that of other Islamic states, is seen as
using Shari'a as a basis for justifying the continued subjection of women. See generally id
6. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern
Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & Soc'Y 279, 293 (1987).
7. John Griffiths, "What is Legal Pluralism?", 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
[Vol. 17:1
"openness" of the law toward society 8 by allowing the coexistence of legal
orders within a social group that do not belong to a single system.9 In
much of the Muslim world, for instance, Shari'a (Islamic law) coexists with
public or national law.' 0 Likewise, many African nations recognize both
national law and customary (tribal) law. The United States as well supports
a system of legal pluralism in which American Indian law exists alongside
federal law.'"
A. LEGAL PLURALISM IN EGYPT: ISLAMIC LAW AND CIVIL LAW
Egypt officially embraces two legal codes: Islamic law and civil law.
However, as the principles of Islam also represent the source of civil law,'
2
it can be argued that all law in Egypt is in fact Islamic.
13
1. Brief History of Egyptian Law
Although the modem nation-state is premised on popular sovereignty,
constitutionalism, and a legal system in which citizens have equal rights
and obligations, Islamic political thought prior to the influence of Western
legal concepts envisaged a system of divine nomocracy, or government
administered in accordance with a divine system of law. 14 Consequently,
Islamic political thought did not conceive of a legitimate secular political
authority and moreover viewed Islamic law as the only law.' 5 Islamic
doctrine has been moving from the theoretical Islamic ideal of a polity as a
religiously based and universalist community of believers, known as the
UNOFFICIAL LAW 1, 9 (1986).
8. Gunther Teubner, Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1443, 1459
(1992).
9. Griffiths, supra note 7, at 5. While the scope of this article precludes a detailed
discussion of legal pluralism, Griffiths' analysis of this topic in terms of its "juristic" and
"social science" perspectives provides a comprehensive understanding of the impact of law
(or laws) on society and custom, as well as the impact of the larger world on law.
10. Shari'a is a code of law regulating both public and private life. However, many
Islamic nations, recognizing the realities of the modem world that generally require
conformity with international norms, have adopted secular Western norms in the realm of
public law, but continue to follow the Shari'a in matters of personal status or private law.
Bharathis Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari'a and the
Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1949 app. I, at 1971-72 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1989).
12. The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt [hereinafter Egyptian Const.],
Part I, art. 2 (provides that "Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation").
13. While Egyptian law uses a legal language familiar to Western jurists for an
equally familiar legal concept, this concept itself is based on rules and concepts of Islamic
law. See generally Maurits S. Berger, Conflicts Law and Public Policy in Egyptian Family
Law: Islamic Law Through the Backdoor, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2002).
14. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Religious Law and Legal Pluralism: Islam and the State,
12CARDozoL.REv. 1015, 1016 (1991).
15. Id.
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umma, to the contemporary reality of a world comprised of nation-states.
16
Conflicts between secular and religious law came along with the adoption
of the modem nation-state as the form of political organization in Muslim
milieus. Despite today's predominance of the modem nation-state as a
political model, the conflict between secular and religious law continues.
Indeed, the influence of Islamic doctrine remains evident in that most
Muslims consider the Qur'an, rather than national law, to be the most
fundamental source of guidance. 
1 7
Egypt exemplifies the dichotomy of dual legal systems by its retention
of both Western-inspired national law and Islamic personal law. 18 While
the Egyptian Constitution' 9 affirms Islam as the state religion,20 and a 1980
amendment recognizes the principles of Islamic jurisprudence as the
principal source of legislation,2' the only area of law where Shari'a is
demonstrably treated as the main source of legislation is personal status law
(also known as "family law").22 The rest of the Egyptian legal system is
based on French civil law.23 Personal status law recognizes "what
differentiates one person from another in terms of natural and family
characteristics and take[s] [this] into consideration by the law to entail legal
effects governing his/her social life.,
24
The status of Egyptian women is derived from this same law, which
25dictates, among others, the rules of marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
Legal issues that fall outside of the personal status area 26 are dealt with by
16. Id. at 1015.
17. Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Islamic and American Constitutional Law: Borrowing
Possibilities or a History of Borrowing?, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 492 (1999).
18. Venkatraman, supra note 10, at 1984.
19. Adopted on September 11, 1971.
20. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, Part I, art. 2.
21. Emory Univ. School of Law, Islamic Family Law, Egypt, Arab Republic of
http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/legal/egypt.htm (last visited April 13, 2004).
22. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East, 35 AM. J.
COMP. L. 127, 139 (1987); The Qur'an devotes much more space to personal status
questions than to other areas of law, so the rules in this area are closely tied to the text of
Divine Revelation. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Religious Law and Legal Pluralism: Islam
and the State, 12 CARDOzO L. REv. 1015, 1027 (1991).
23. UNDP- POGAR: United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the
Arab Region, Egypt: Women in Public Life, http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/zegypt/
gender.html (last visited September 11, 2005).
24. Y. Qassem, Law of the Family (Personal Status Law), in EGYPT AND ITS LAWS
19 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron & Baudouin Dupret eds., 2002) (citing a decision by the
Egyptian Court of Cassation, 21 June 1934).
25. While Islamic law guides Muslim Egyptians in these areas, non-Muslim
Egyptians depend on their religious laws and religious communities. Non-Muslim
Egyptians are composed of Christians and Jews, each group has its own provisions
governing marriage and divorce. Egypt recognizes one Muslim, two Jewish and 12
Christian communities, with a total of eight personal status laws. The number of laws is less
than the communities because some communities share the same law. Berger, supra note
13, at n.15.
26. Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1I
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secular courts with judges trained along Western jurisprudential lines.
27
Despite the prominent role of personal status law in governing individual's
social lives, no comprehensive code governing the rights of the family has
been promulgated to date.28 However, there exist several important laws
adopted by the Egyptian legislature in this regard. For the purposes of this
paper, only personal status laws concerning marriage will be examined.
2. The Egyptian Court System and Personal Status Law
Earlier, Shari'a courts existed as separate courts, but in 1956 they were
integrated into the National Courts. 29 Judges trained in Shari'a preside over
family law cases within the National Courts.30 Appeals of cases are heard
by regular judges in the Court of Appeals and then the Court of Cassation.3'
These cases may also eventually be heard by the Supreme Constitutional
Court. If a case is reviewed by the Supreme Constitutional Court, the
implications are potentially far-reaching since this court is granted the
power of statutory interpretation as well as judicial review. 32 Indeed, the
Court is not obliged to restrict itself to the immediate question raised.
Upon seeing related constitutional violations linked to the original
question, the Court has been active in bringing the entire statute into line
with constitutional requirements by engaging in statutory interpretation
while remaining in the purview of judicial review.
33
3. Personal Status Law and Marriage in Egypt
Personal status law guides all aspects of marriage in Egypt.
Specifically, this body of law sets out the requirements necessary to
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1099 (2004). Several attempts to establish one
comprehensive code governing family issues have been made, including a committee set up
in 1962 to review the draft code of personal status. Although the objective was to issue a
comprehensive personal status code, the draft is still pending.
27. When the Westernization of legal systems occurred, Islamic law was historically
dispensed within areas where the State placed a premium on efficiency and rapid
modernization such as government, finance, administration, commercial law, and criminal
law, among others. In general, lower priority was accorded to reforms enhancing women's
rights, particularly those that would affect the preservation of Shari'a rule of personal status.
Further, moves to replace Shari'a law with Western law were deterred by political and
religious conservatives. See Mayer, supra note 22, at 139-143.
28. Several attempts to establish one comprehensive code governing family issues
have been made including a committee set up in 1962 to review the draft code of personal
status. Although the objective was to issue a comprehensive personal status code, the draft
is still pending. Abu-Odeh, supra note 26.
29. Emory U. School of Law, supra note 21.
30. There are separate family law chambers for Copts, see id.
31. Id.
32. Adel Omar Sherif, The Rule of Law in Egypt From a Judicial Perspective: A
Digest of Landmark Decisions of The Supreme Constitutional Court, in THE RULE OF LAW IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD 1, 4 (Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., I.B.
Tauris & Co. Ltd. 2000).
33. Id. at 3.
Winter 2006]
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establish a marriage contract and, further, defines the rights and obligations
of wives and husbands. Personal status law also delineates rights and
obligations associated with divorce and polygamy.
a. Establishment of a Marriage Contract
Under Shari'a, a woman does not have the right to contract her own
marriage. Rather, she needs a wali (guardian) to contract the marriage on
her behalf.34 Her guardian is required to be male and is usually her father.
35
In the absence of the father, the grandfather or another male relative may
serve as guardian.36
Guardianship of the father (or his surrogate) is not meant to be
37tyrannical: a woman may accept or refuse an offer of marriage.
Nevertheless, the legal condition of requiring a guardian to contract a
marriage denies a woman of majority age the guarantee of equality of
opportunity afforded by the Constitution.38 Part II, article 8 of the
Constitution provides that "[t]he State shall guarantee equality of
opportunity to all citizens. 39  Unlike a man wishing to enter into a
marriage contract, a woman's desire to enter into a marriage contract must
be approved by her guardian. If no approval is forthcoming, she will be
prevented from doing so.40 Clearly, a woman's dependence on her
guardian eliminates the opportunity for her to enter into marriage
autonomously. This situation not only violates a woman's constitutional
right of equality of opportunity,41 but also diminishes her status since it
effectively relegates her to a position of legal minor rather than a mature
adult.
42
b. Rights in a Marriage
An Egyptian woman is entitled to both financial and nonfinancial rights
in a marriage, such as the right to require a dowry that is hers alone to do
34. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Women's Rights, 12 AM.
U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (1997).
35. The requirement that a wali contract the marriage was historically defended as a
protective measure for women who may be swept by their emotions and in order to protect a
family's honor in cases where women elect to marry ineligible males. Id. at 15.
36. Qassem, supra note 24, at n.10.
37. Id. at 22, quoting a hadith (saying of the prophet) wherein: "A virgin maiden
went to the prophet complaining that her father had coerced her into a marriage against her
will. The prophet granted her freedom of choice," i.e., he gave her the right to opt for
acceptance of that marriage or its rejection.
38. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, Part II, ch. 1, art. 8.
39. Id.
40. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1, 10 (1997).
41. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, at Part II, art. 8.
42. al-Hibri questions why a woman is required to have a wali today since men are
not subject to the same requirement and in response, asserts three reasons: the Qur'an,
stereotyping, and the nature of patriarchal society. al-Hibri, supra note 34, at 17-18.
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with as she pleases, the right to own property, the right to earnings, and the
right to not be harmed by her husband. Yet a husband's rights in a
marriage often effectively negate those of his wife.43 Among the several
rights afforded a husband through a marriage contract, his right to
obedience from his wife, in particular, places women at a disadvantage. 4
Obedience from a wife may require her to gain permission from her
husband to engage in work outside the home.45 This situation effectively
denies a woman her right to accumulate wealth through earnings and
significantly contributes to her economic dependence on her husband.46
This tenuous economic situation can be further exacerbated since a wife
who "disobeys" may also be denied maintenance,47 i.e., financial
sustenance consisting of food, clothing, housing, toiletries, and medical
48attention. This is a serious matter for financially vulnerable women and
their children.49
In situations of divorce the effects of this limitation become
particularly pronounced. A woman who has been restricted from working
outside of the home rarely has assets of her own.50 In addition, she is also
unlikely to have any training to be able to earn wages.5 1 As a consequence,
many women become instantly destitute upon divorce. Moreover, because
of their nonvirgin status, divorced women have little hope of remarrying.
5 2
In addition to requiring a wife to obey her husband, a husband also has
43. While justice is the hallmark of Islam, Muslim societies have been dispensing
injustices to women in the name of Islam. This results in large part from the patriarchal
reality in Muslim countries, which differs greatly from the Islamic one. In cases of unhappy
marriages, divorce or custody, even women's own families have ignored Islamic law
protections for women. For a thorough discussion of Muslim women's rights, see Azizah
Yahia al-Hibri, Muslim Women's Rights in the Global Village: Challenges and
Opportunities, 15 J. L. & RELIGION 101 (2001).
44. Id. at n.99, referring to Egyptian Code, Act No. 25 (1920) & Act No. 25 (1929)
as both are amended by Act No. 100 (1985), L. No. 25 ch.2, art. 11 Repeated Twice (1929)
(amend. 1985).
45. See Reservations Made by Egypt to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 3.2(b), http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_
library/EGYPTIWOMEN/200.HTM (last visited Sept. 9, 2005) (stating that while a wife is
entitled to leave her house without permission for work, if she is perceived to "abuse" her
right to work and her husband requests her not to work, she may not go out of the house for
employment purposes).
46. al-Hibri, supra note 43, at n.100.
47. Id., citing Egyptian Code, L. No. 25 ch. 1 art. 1 (1929) (amend. 1985), and
stating that "the wife loses her right to maintenance if she refuses to have conjugal relations
with her husband or leaves her home without her husband's permission (unless she has a
legitimate reason for leaving)."
48. Blenkhom, supra note 3, at 196.
49. al-Hibri, supra note 43, at 118-19.
50. Blenkhom, supra note 3, at 200.
51. Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the
Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 285 (1997).
52. Blenkhom, supra note 3, at 202.
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the right of decision-making at home. Included in this right is the wife's
obligation to settle down in her husband's home and not to leave it without
his permission, except in some cases when it is not possible to obtain his
permission.53 This right conflicts with Article 41 of the Constitution
concerning "public freedoms, rights and duties" which states: "Individual
freedom is a natural right and shall not be touched. 54 By forbidding a wife
from leaving the marital home without permission from her husband,
personal status law serves to deny a wife her constitutional guarantee of
"individual freedom., 55  Indeed, Article 41 goes on to declare that "no
person may [have] his freedom restricted or prevented from free movement
except by and or necessitated by investigations and preservation of the
security of the society" (emphasis added). 56
While constitutional law is generally understood to deal with state
powers rather than individual action, 57 the Egyptian Constitution's
recognition of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence as the principle
source of legislation 58 arguably subjects both state and individual behavior
to constitutional law. Personal status law's demonstrable treatment of
Shari'a as the main source of legislation 59 supports this notion. Just as
national law governs state action, personal status law governs the actions of
individuals. Therefore, the explicit legal right of a husband to restrict the
free movement of his wife under Shari'a expressly contradicts the right to
individual freedom guaranteed by the Constitution.6 °
c. Polygamy
According to Egyptian Personal Status Law No. 100 of 1985,
polygamy for husbands is permissible so long as existing and intended
wives are notified. The wife of a polygamous husband may demand a
divorce within one year of the date her husband has taken another wife.6'
However, the original wife's right to a divorce on grounds of polygamy is
not automatic.62 Rather, a divorce because of polygamy may be obtained
53. Qassem, supra note 24, at 22.
54. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, at Part III, art. 41.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Constitutional law, according to Egyptian jurists, examines the system of
government within the state and its sovereign powers and their competencies. It also
defines public rights, freedoms and the guarantees for individuals in exercising such rights.
A. Sherif, Constitutional Law, in EGYPT AND ITs LAWS 315 (N. Bernard-Maugiron & B.
Dupret eds., Kluwer Law International 2002).
58. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, at Part III, art. 41.
59. Mayer, supra note 22, at 139.
60. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, at Part III, art. 41.
61. A wife forfeits her right to claim a divorce for this reason one year after having
obtained knowledge of the second marriage, or even before then if she has explicitly or
implicitly accepted it.
62. Before the Personal Status (Amendment) Law (Law no. 100/1985) was enacted
to revise the 1920 and 1929 Laws on Personal Status, a wife had an automatic right
[Vol. 17:1
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only if a judge is satisfied that, as a result of her husband's remarriage, a
wife has endured financial or psychological harm. In addition, a judge
must direct the parties to attempt reconciliation before making such a
ruling.63
Once again, the existence of religious law alongside national law points
to the inequity and disadvantage that women experience as a result of a
dual legal system. By permitting a husband to marry more than one wife,
Islamic law provides a man with the opportunity to engage in polygamy.
However, the law does not provide this same opportunity to women,
instead forbidding women from marrying more than one husband. This
lack of equality of opportunity (to enter into a marriage) violates Chapter 1,
Article 8, of the Constitution.64
In addition to violating women's constitutional right to equal
opportunity, the Egyptian personal status law allowing polygamy also
denies them their constitutional right to be treated equally before the law.6 5
According to the Qur'an, men may marry as many as four wives so long as
they treat their wives equitably and fairly.6 6 Yet, the Qur'an also states that
it is not possible to be equitable and fair in polygamous situations.67
Indeed, the Qur'an expressly states that polygamy results in injustice.
68
While the Constitution guarantees all Egyptians the right to be treated
equally before the law, Personal Status Law No. 100 of 1985 subjects
women to disparate treatment and thereby denies them this right.
As the Qur'an makes clear, a wife in a polygamous marriage is
necessarily subject to inequitable and unfair treatment.69 Further, a woman
may be precluded from divorce unless she can prove an injury resulting
from this situation.70  A husband, on the other hand, experiences no
injustice in this marital arrangement and, moreover, retains his unilateral
right to divorce. 7' The disparate impact of this personal status law
effectively violates Egyptian women's guaranteed right to equal treatment
under the law.
In sum, men's rights in marriage often conflict with women's
to divorce her husband if he married polygamously. As a concession to religious
conservatives, the presumption of injury occasioned by a polygamous marriage, as
evidenced in Law No. 44 of 1979, was removed.
63. Law No. 100 returns to the teachings of the Shari'a with regard to provisions
relating to grounds for divorce and the allocation of support. See 12 Ann. Rev. Population
L. 1, 335-38.
64. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, at Ch. 1, art. 8.
65. Id. at Part III, art. 40. (All citizens are equal before law.)
66. For a brief but informative discussion of the complex Qur'anic statement on
polygamy, see al-Hibri, supra note 43, at 121 (citing Qur'an 4:3).
67. Id. (citing Qur'an 4:129).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Egyptian Const., supra note 12, at Part I, art. 2.
71. Berger, supra note 13, at 579.
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constitutional rights as well as the marriage rights afforded women by
Islamic law. Men's right to prohibit a woman from contracting her own
marriage, earning an income, leaving her marital home, and divorcing if
her husband takes another wife, are just a few examples of how men's
rights under Islamic marriage laws eclipse those of women. This
incongruity places women at greater risk vis-d-vis their economic situation,
as well as that of their children, and also causes serious emotional
consequences that affect a woman's dignity and self-esteem. 72 More
importantly, it weakens Egyptian women's status overall by subordinating
or, in many instances, completely denying their rights in favor of the rights
of men.
B. LEGAL PLURALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: CUSTOMARY LAW AND
GENERAL LAW
A characteristic feature of the legal systems of most former European
colonies in Africa is the plurality of customary and religious laws that co-
existed with the imported European law.73 South Africa, a former Dutch
and later British colony, is no different in this regard since Roman-Dutch
law 74 in general, coexisted with official customary law 75 throughout the
years of colonization. Today, customary law continues to coexist with
national law.
76
72. Reservations Made by Egypt to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 45, at 3.1.
73. Anne Helium, Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial Africa:
Options and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 635, 636
(2000).
74. The British conquered the Cape Colony first in 1795 and then in 1806 Roman-
Dutch law was confirmed to the settlers. This was typical of 19th century international legal
practice in that when a territory was conquered from a "civilized" (i.e., Western) power, the
existing law remained in place. When lands never before colonized were conquered, the
new settlers brought with them their own law. Over time, however, the Roman-Dutch law
of South Africa became Anglicized. [3-B South Africa] THOMAS H. REYNOLDS & ARTURO
A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS
OF THE WORLD, 4 (William S. Hein & Co. 2003).
75. An exception to this general rule was in the Cape Colony. In 1806 when Britain
took occupation of the cape under treaty of cession with the Netherlands, the new colonial
authorities assumed that the local law was Roman-Dutch and, consequently, did not
recognize indigenous customary law. T.W. Bennett, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW SERIES OF THE COMMUNITY LAW CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CENTRE,
Human Rights and African Customary Law Under the South African Constitution, 18-19
(Juta & Co, LTD 1995) (citing R v. Harrison & Dryburgh, 1922 A.D. 320 at 330 (S.Afr.)).
76. Official recognition of customary law is found in Chapter 12 of the Constitution
that provides for the recognition and role of traditional leaders and stipulates that "[t]he
courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law." S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 12, §
211(3).
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1. A Brief History of South African Law
Although everyone was initially subject to Roman-Dutch law, 77 a
realistic appraisal of the problem of governing a large and potentially
rebellious population called for recognition of aboriginal law.78
Consequently, a Royal Instruction of March 8, 1848, directed that local
laws and customs were not to be abrogated unless they were "repugnant to
the general principles of humanity recognized throughout the whole
civilized world., 79 This same basic approach to African law was adopted
for government of the Transkei territories. 80  In essence, "official"
customary law was created in the context of the specific historical
circumstances of the colonial encounter in southern Africa.8 Customary
law was transformed from a body of customs and norms unique to each
tribe and applied by tribal members to a body of law that was formally
recognized and applied by government officials.
77. Roman-Dutch law was made applicable in Transvaal by section 17 of Proc 14 of
1902 (Transvaal), and in Natal by Ord 12 of 1845 (Cape). T.W. Bennett & C.H. Powell,
Aboriginal Title in South Africa Revisited, http://www.firstpeople.org/land.rights/southem-
africa/summary/aborig%7E2.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
78. Bennett, supra note 75, at 19.
79. Made operative by Ord 3 of 1849 (Natal). Bennett & Powell, supra note 77.
80. Because the inhabitants were believed "not sufficiently advanced in civilization
and social progress" to be governed by common law (Hailey Lord, An African Survey: A
study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara 2 ed. 350 (1945) OUP), courts were
given discretion to apply customary law, provided that it was "compatible with the general
principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized world." Bennett, supra note 75, at
19.
81. Jill Zimmerman, Note, Border People and Antidiscrimination Law: The
Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa: Method and Discourse, 17 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 197, 199 (Spring 2001). "Official" customary law, i.e., codified law,
should be distinguished from the general concept of customary law, i.e., living law. The
former is generally understood as "the cumulative of all legislative enactments and judicial
pronouncements on African social tradition and custom." Hon. Yvonne Mokgoro, The
Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1279, 1281
(Fall, 1997). However, because of the self-serving political ideals of successive colonial
governments and indigenous patriarchal leaders, customary law that was formalized through
legislation and infused with the conservatism of positive law is now widely considered an
"invented tradition." See The Invention of Tradition (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger
eds., 1983); Mokgoro, supra, at 1281; Zimmerman, supra, at 202. In contrast, the latter, as
living law, is more closely related to African social tradition and customs that respond to
society's contemporary values and reflect its stage of social development. As pointed out
by Mokgoro, "There is [a] general tendency to romanticize African custom or tradition as an
expression of African social values, pure and unchanged by colonial influence. The truth of
the matter is that much of the social tradition and custom has evolved with the development
of traditional communities over time." Mokgoro, supra, at 1281-1282. Finally, perhaps the
most definitive distinction separating customary (living) law from "official" customary
(codified) law is the fact that the former is unwritten while the latter, as codified law, is
written. Lona N. Laymon, Valid-Where-Consummated: The Intersection of Customary Law
Marriages and Formal Adjudication, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 353, 356 (Spring 2001).
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A uniform approach to recognizing customary law in South Africa was
eventually imposed in 1927, with the passing of the Native Administration
Act.82 Certain courts were given discretion to apply customary law in legal
suits between Africans. In 1988, all courts were granted this discretion.
83
While laws indigenous to South Africa were uniformly recognized by
the government, their application was governed by ad hoc responses to
particular social and political problems. The state exercised discretion in
deciding whether, and to what extent, customary law should be
recognized.84 Courts were obliged to consider all aspects of a case and on
the basis of their inquiry, without any prejudice in favor of common or
customary law, to select the appropriate legal system. 85 In addition, this
law was limited primarily to the statutorily defined limits of marriage,
family, succession, and land tenure.86 In effect, "customary law was
considered a second-rate system by the South African government.
Roman-Dutch law was always treated as the general law of the land and the
model to which customary law should conform.
87
The end of apartheid and the beginning of political transformation in
1994 brought about a variety of changes including the drafting of an
interim 88 and a new Constitution. The interim Constitution continued to
recognize customary law and, moreover, elevated its status by referencing a
number of major provisions that were based on this body of law.8 9 For
instance, it was earlier argued that "the choice of law principle in South
African jurisprudence provided a person with the freedom to participate in
his or her cultural life." "Section 31 of the interim Constitution, however,
introduced the notion of this choice as a right."90 A person had the right to
insist on the application of customary law in appropriate legal proceedings
as opposed to relying on the discretion of governmental authorities to do
so. 91 This view of customary law "has done much to improve the overall
status of customary law ... [and] it is evident that customary law is at last
achieving recognition as a foundation of the South Africa legal system.',
92
82. Bennett, supra note 75, at 19.
83. Department of Justice, Laws Administered by the Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development, The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, s. 1(1),
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/legislation/acts/act-admin/acad80.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2005).
84. Bennett, supra note 75, at 19.
85. Id. at 51-52.
86. Bennett, supra note 75, at 20.
87. The historical debates over recognition of African customary law continue today
as made evident by the SA Law Commission Project 90: The Harmonization of the
Common Law and the Indigenous Law, Report on Conflicts of Law, [hereinafter
CONFLICTS REPORT] sections 1.54-1.55. See Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 205.
88. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993.
89. Mokgoro, supra note 81, at 1284.
90. Id. at 1285.
91. Id.
92. Zimmerman, supra note 8 1, at 205.
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While the Constitution is considered the supreme law of the Republic, 93 it
continues to require the courts to apply customary law.94
2. The South African Court System and Customary Law
While historically there existed a divided court structure that applied
either South African national law or the subordinate system of African
customary law, today customary law is afforded equal recognition with
national law. Indeed, customary law is specifically addressed in the twelfth
chapter of the country's Constitution, which states that courts are obliged to
"apply customary law when that law is applicable." 95 Like all other laws,
customary law is also "subject to the Constitution and any legislation that
specifically deals with customary law."
96
Of particular significance, however, is the role of traditional authorities
in applying customary law. While all courts may employ customary law if
appropriate, the South African Constitution recognizes "the institution,
status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law" 97 and
permits this leadership to "deal with matters relating to ... the role of...
customary law and the customs of communities observing a system of
customary law.",98 Consequently, traditional leaders, who may frequently
lack legal training or an understanding of the Constitution, are authorized
to apply customary law. Considering that "traditional leaders have
appealed to cultural relativist Africanist discourses to resist
democratization and the recognition of women's rights,"99 their role in
applying customary law is suspect since it is likely to the disadvantage of
women subject to this law. Recent history supports this contention.
During the 1992-1993 constitutional negotiations in Kempton Park,
traditional authorities presented a proposal to exempt customary law from
the reach of the Bill of Rights. Mwelo Nonkonana, who spoke on behalf of
the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA),
argued that the Bill of Rights would "inflict irreparable harm on the
entrenched cultural values of the indigenous people of South Africa."' 00
93. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 chs. 1, 2; "The supremacy of the Constitution stands in
direct contrast to the previous administration system, where, in accordance with the British
tradition that applied since the British War at the beginning of this century, parliament was
sovereign and above the law. South Africa is now a democratic, constitutional state. All
three branches of government, legislative, executive, and the judicial, are bound by the
Constitution's provisions." J.C. Sonnekus, South Africa's Transition to Democracy and the
Rule of Law, 29 INT'L LAW. 659, 661 (1995).
94. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 12, § 211(3); see also Mokgoro, supra note 81, at 1286.
95. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 12, § 211(3).
96. Id. § 211(3).
97. Id. § 211(1).
98. Id. §§ 211(1), 212(2).
99. Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 205-06.
100. Id. at 206.
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Although CONTRALESA's proposal was not accepted,'0 ' it clearly
demonstrates the possibility of traditional leaders misusing customary law.
3. Customary Law and Marriage in South Africa
Historically, "civil law marriage was the only marriage that had full
legal recognition in the former Republic of South Africa."' 0 2 Customary
law marriages 0 3 were first accorded official recognition with the passage
of The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act in 1998 (hereinafter,
"Marriage Act"), 104 which became law in November 2000.10' The
Marriage Act repealed the "infamous section 11 (3) of the Black
Administration Act of 1927 which condemned African women to a legal
state of 'perpetual minority'. ' '1°6 By requiring that all customary marriages
occurring after the new law was passed abide by the rules of the new order,
the Marriage Act served to ameliorate the position of women by creating an
equitable marriage relationship between men and women. 0 7 However, the
Marriage Act fails to improve the status of all women since it only affords
its protections to customary unions that occurred before the law was passed
if these marriages are registered under the new Marriage Act.
108
South Africans married under customary law before the new law was
passed had only had one year (until November 14, 2001) to register such a
101. In response to CONTRALESA's proposal to exempt customary law from the
Bill of Rights, black women delegates led a fight to oppose it. In addition, when a
compromise clause was suggested that limited the right to equality, various rural women's
organizations sent submissions opposing the clause. Politicized by their involvement in the
liberation movement, rural women have consistently repeated an organized demand for
fifty-fifty representation in all local government and development councils, the abolition of
polygamy, independent rights to land, and the joint registration of all marital property.
Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 206-07.
102. Chuma Himonga, Legislative and judicial approaches to the reform of the
customary law of marriage and succession in South Africa: Implications for the
advancement of women 's rights (Oct., 2003), http://www.wlce.co.za/conference2003/
2003conference himonga.php. (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
103. Customary marriage in South Africa refers to marriages contracted according to
African customary law. It does not include marriages contracted according to other
"noncivil" law, such as Islamic law.
104. No. 120 of 1998; the Act became law on 15 November 2000.
105. Women's Legal Centre, Customary Law: The Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act, http://www.wlce.co.za/publication2.html.
106. Misanet.com, New Customary Marriages Act Sees Women as Equal Partners
(Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.afrol.com/CategoriesiWomen/wom010_sa-marriage.htm; see
also Radhika Gokul, Equality and Gender in African Customary Law in South Africa,
http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/lrgru/equapap/gokul.pdf. Section 6 of the Act is particularly
relevant in that it gives the wife in a customary marriage full status and capacity, which
includes the capacity to acquire and dispose of assets, to conclude contracts and to litigate.
107. For a useful discussion concerning the approaches taken by the South African
legislature and courts to advance the rights of women under the customary law of marriage
and their implications, see Himonga, supra note 102.
108. Women's Legal Centre, supra note 105 (noting that in order to benefit from the
Marriage Act, i.e., to receive protection for legal rights concerning, among others, property,
maintenance and inheritance rights, a marriage must be officially registered).
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marriage. 109 For the purposes of this essay, customary law marriages that
were not registered within the allotted time frame will be referred to as
"nonregistered" customary law marriages. "Nonregistered" customary
marriages, although officially recognized by the Marriage Act as valid
unions, nevertheless remain subject to customary law.110 The following
discussion addresses the implications of legal pluralism for women who are
spouses in "nonregistered" customary marriages.
a. Establishment of a Marriage Contract
Under customary law, "the position of women with regard to marriage
is circumscribed." Women may not negotiate or terminate their own
marriages.' Moreover, a woman's consent to enter a marriage is
generally not required in that her lack of consent is not considered a bar to
the union.'
1 2
In order to consider a marriage wholly valid, customary law generally
requires the payment of lobolo, or "the property in cash or in kind...
which a prospective husband or the head of his family undertakes to give to
the head of the prospective wife's family in consideration of a customary
marriage." ' 13 Lobolo is given to the bride's family partly in return for the
transfer of authority over the woman to her husband's family. As such, it
represents the husband's marital power.1 4 Accordingly, if a wife "returns
to her family, the lobolo, or a portion thereof, must be returned." "
5
Entering into a marriage contract under customary law manifestly
perpetuates the subordinate role of a woman by relegating her status to that
of a minor. By not requiring a woman's consent to enter into a marriage,
customary law further denies a woman her right to equality and dignity
afforded by the Constitution. 1 6  In addition, the practice of lobolo,
symbolizing a husband's marital power over his wife, also denies a
woman's right to equality." 7 In sum, establishing a marriage contract
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. T.R. Nhlapo, The African Family and Women's Rights: Friends or Foes?, 1991
Acta Juridica 135, 138-139.
112. Christine Mary Venter, The New South African Constitution: Facing the
Challenges of Women's Rights and Cultural Rights in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 21 J.
LEGIS. 1, 8 (1995) citing A.C. Myburgh, Papers on Indigenous Law in Southern Africa 79,
85 (1990).
113. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. l(iv); Republic of
South Africa Government Gazette, Vol. 402, No. 19539 (Dec. 2, 1998).
114. While the significance of lobolo has been diminished through the Marital
Property Act (S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 8(3)(a)), which purports to abolish a husband's
marital power, this is true only for those couples marrying under civil law. For wives who
are part of "nonregistered" customary law marriages, lobolo and all that it signifies still
applies. Himonga, supra note 102.
115. Venter, supra note 112, at 9.
116. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, §§ 9(2), 10.
117. Id. ch. 2, § 9(2).
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according to customary law effectively discriminates against women based
on their gender and, accordingly, is in direct violation of Chapter 2, section
9 (4), of the Constitution. This discrimination not only deprives women of
exercising their constitutional rights, but, moreover, weakens their overall
status in society by not treating them with the human dignity afforded
men.
118
b. Rights in a Marriage
A husband in a customary marriage has the right of chastisement over
his wife. This right entitles him not only to chastise his wife but also to
physically discipline her for relatively minor infringements." 19  The
authority of the husband over his wife also extends to members of his
kinship group. If a woman's husband should die, for instance, the members
of his family group can "continue to assert their authority over the woman,
"requiring her [ ] to 'till the soil' as well as cook."'120 Another aspect of this
authority is the "right to require the woman to make her reproductive
services available to a certain member of the group and bear his children."
In some tribes, this results in the practice of the deceased husband's brother
taking the woman as his wife. The death of the husband fails to dissolve
the marriage and "the wife may be required to remain with her husband's
family group and bear children to a member of that group." 121
The virtually comprehensive authority of a husband over his wife (both
during his lifetime and even after his death) is at odds with the guarantees
of equality' 22 and dignity 123 under South Africa's Constitution. Indeed, by
depriving a wife of her prerogative, inter alia, to decide whether to marry
and whether to remain in a marriage, as well as subjecting her to the
unquestioned authority of her husband in very nearly all matters, customary
marriage law violates the constitutional right of women to experience "the
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.' 24  In addition, it
deprives women of the right to have their "dignity respected and protected"
as guaranteed under the Constitution. 1
25
118. The Constitutional Court has pointed out "that in particular circumstances the
rights of equality and dignity are closely related." National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality and Another v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 31 (S.
Aft.). The Court has also noted that "the denial of equal dignity and worth all too quickly
and insidiously degenerates into a denial of humanity and leads to inhuman treatment by the
rest of society in many ways." Id. at para. 42. This, in turn, "perpetuates[s] and
reinforces[s] existing prejudices and stereotypes" resulting in an "invasion of [one's]
dignity" which is respected and protected by section 10 of the South African Constitution.
Id. at para. 54.
119. Venter, supra note 112, at 9.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 9(2).
123. Id. ch. 2, § 10.
124. Id. ch. 2, § 9(2).
125. Id. ch. 2, § 10.
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A husband's right to control his wife's labor and reproductive functions
is also in direct contravention of assorted constitutional guarantees.
126
According to Chapter 2, section 12 (2)(a) of the Constitution, "[e]veryone
has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right
to make decisions concerning reproduction.' 27 Clearly, being denied her
right to decide whether to have children and with whom, under customary
law a wife is divested of her right to make decisions concerning
childbearing. In addition, Chapter 2, section 13 states that "[n]o one may
be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour."' 128  Affording a
husband the right to his wife's labor creates, at best, a condition of
servitude and, at worst, forced labor.
In addition to a husband's right to exercise virtually complete authority
over his wife, customary law also affords a husband exclusive rights over
property. 29 The Marriage Act attempts to bring customary law in line with
the Constitution by stating that customary marriages entered into after the
commencement of the Marriage Act will be in community of property and
of profit and loss 130 unless otherwise indicated in an antenuptial contract.
However, this property system does not apply to "nonregistered"
customary marriages. Indeed, Section 7(1) of the Marriage Act expressly
notes that the proprietary consequences of a customary marriage entered
into before the Marriage Act's commencement are still to be governed by
126. While constitutional rights generally limit government, as opposed to individual
action, equality rights afforded under the South African Constitution address the actions of
both government and individuals. The fundamental character of these rights has been
confirmed by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000. The Act gives effect to Section 9 of the Constitution by stipulating that "no person
may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground of gender," and proscribes "the
system of preventing women from inheriting family property" and "any practice, including
traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women and
undermines equality between women and men .. " Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 211-12,
quoting Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, s. 8.
Customary marriage laws that deny women their right to make decisions concerning
childbearing and effectively subject women to a condition of servitude or forced labor
amount to unfair discrimination based on gender. Consequently, these laws, as well as the
individuals who act in accordance with them or even customary practices not codified into
law, infringe on the right to equality of women afforded by the Constitution.
127. Id. § 12 (2)(a). "Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity,
which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction."
128. Id. ch. 2, § 13.
129. Venter, supra note 112, at 9.
130. Being married in community of property means that you have one joint estate.
All assets are jointly owned and all debts are jointly owed, including those that either party
had before the marriage. The parties are co-administrators of the joint estate and there are
various transactions that require the consent of both parties. For example, both parties
would have to consent to the selling or bonding of immovable property and the ceding of
any policies. Siva Naidoo, Consumerwise: Ins and Outs of Marriage Contracts, SUNDAY
TIMES (Durban, S. Aft.), Sep. 7, 2003, http://www.suntimes.co.za/2003/09/07/news/durban/
ndbnl2.asp; see also Women's Legal Centre, supra note 105.
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customary law.' 3 1  Accordingly, women in "nonregistered" customary
marriages remain subject to this patriarchal and gendered system of law.
The consequences for women subject to customary law as it relates to
property are substantial. Women are at a clear "disadvantage in relation to
married men with regard to accessing resources in rural areas."'132 Even if
obtained, however, resources held by women are considered the property of
their husbands. As a person subject to permanent guardianship in one form
or another, a woman may generally own no property in her own name.
Property acquired by her during the marriage also accrues to her
husband. 33 By denying women the right to own property, the rules of
customary law marriage violate Chapter 2 section 25 (1) of the
Constitution. 134
c. Polygamy
"A woman subject to African customary law may also find herself in
the position of not being her husband's only wife since polygamy is
practiced among many tribes in South Africa.' 135 In addition, women in
customary law marriages have no recourse to this situation. While men are
permitted to have more than one wife according to customary law, women
are not entitled to have more than one husband. 36 Affording men a right
that women do not have violates the Constitutional right to equality. 37 In
addition, allowing men to have more than one wife degrades the status of
women 138 and thereby contravenes the Constitution's "Bill of Rights
[which] applies to all law"'139 (including customary law) and which "affirms
the democratic value of human dignity."'
40
In sum, in an African customary law marriage, a woman's position is
not on par with a man's position in many respects. On the basis of her sex,
she is accorded an inferior status and, consequently, treated as somewhat
less than a person. Not only is a woman denied many constitutional rights
131. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 7(1);
http://www.afrol.com/Categories/Women/wom010_sa mariage.htm; see also Gokul, supra
note 106.
132. Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 21, referencing South African Law Commission,
Discussion Paper 93, Project 90: Customary Law: Succession, §§ 4.2.13-4.2.16.
133. Venter, supra note 112, at 9.
134. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 25(1) ("No one may be deprived of property
except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation
of property.").
135. Venter, supra note 112, at 9.
136. Bennett, supra note 75, at 120.
137. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 9(2).
138. Bennett, supra note 75, at n.59 (noting that one of the reasons put forth in
Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) at 1024 (S. Afr.) for refusing to recognize an Islamic
marriage was that polygamy degrades the status of women and consequently, is contrary to
public policy).
139. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 8(1).
140. Id. ch. 2, § 7(1).
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based on customary marriage laws, but the institution itself with its
inherent disparities undermines the achievement of gender equality which
is a founding value of the Constitution. 14 1  By discriminating against
women and denying them their constitutional rights, customary marriage
laws serve to diminish women's overall status in society.
C. LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES: INDIAN LAW AND
FEDERAL LAW
Indians living in the United States are members of sovereign nations
that had been conquered in war or otherwise forced to submit to the
authority of the United States. 142 As a conquered people, the United States
Congress regulates the internal affairs of Indian tribes. 143 One aspect of
this regulation has been the recognition of Indian tribes' retention of "their
original natural rights" in matters of local government. 144 This recognition,
in turn, resulted in the development of Indian law as distinct from federal
law 145 and from state law
1. A Brief History of American Law
The sovereign status of American Indian nations existed prior to the
formation of the United States and continued afterwards. 146  As either
conquered 47 or soon-to-be conquered nations, they were forced to submit
to the authority of the United States. 48 Indian nations' sovereign status is
further underscored by the fact that they are not signatories to the United
States' Constitution and did not join the federation of powers.
Consequently, although the Constitution explicitly regulates the
141. By discriminating against women, customary law marriage contravenes the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2002, which gives
effect to section 9, the equality provision, of the Constitution; S. AR. CONST. 1996 ch. 1, §
l(a); see also Bannatyne v. Bannatyne, Case CCT 18/02 (discussing the gendered nature of
the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 and noting the Constitutional value of achieving gender
equality).
142. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of
Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part I of 11), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 295
(Spring 1988).
143. Congress' power to regulate the internal affairs of Indian tribes was upheld by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (noting that
Congress had the power to protect its "wards"). See Resnik, supra note 11, at 692.
144. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 142, at 296 quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 295.
147. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra at 295 ("In addition to the U.S. Constitution,
international law governs relations between tribes and the United States. International law
acknowledges the authority of conquerors and imposes obligations on them. . . . In
principle, the American government's power over Indian tribes is rooted in, and limited by,
occupatio bellica [a term that refers to a conquered people who persist, leaving the defeated
nation as a legal subject]").
148. Id.
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relationship of Indian nations with the federal and state governments,
Indian nations- "nonparties" to the Constitution - are not circumscribed
by provisions such as the Bill of Rights. 149  Rather, the relationship
between the Indian tribes and the federal government is more aptly
characterized as "pre-constitutional" and "extra-constitutional."' 150 Indeed,
"no act of interpretation and no elaboration of consent theory can explain
federal exercise of power and dominion over Indian tribes."'' In fact,
legal relations between the United States and Indian tribes undermine the
central tenets of federal courts' jurisprudence - that the Constitution is the
beginning of the analysis for the exercise of all the powers of the federal
government, and that, by constitutional interpretation, the federal powers
are limited and constrained.
52
As Chief Justice Marshall's famous oxymoron illustrates, in the United
States, American Indian nations are considered "domestic dependant
nation[s].' 53  In further elaborating on this status, Justice Marshall, in
Worcester v. Georgia,'54 described tribes in Georgia as "distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive."'
' 55
Despite their "sovereign" status under United States law, Indian tribes
are also subject to intrusions by federal authorities since they are also
legally "dependent" on the federal government.' 56 The paradox of being
simultaneously sovereign and dependent raises questions about the scope of
tribal power relative to federal and state governments.157 The upshot of this
inconsistency is particularly apparent in cases involving the application of
tribal law, especially as it pertains to Indian women's rights.
2. The United States Court System and Indian Tribal Law
As "domestic" sovereigns, i.e., separate governments, Indian nations
enjoy both political and cultural sovereignty. 58 This includes the right to
establish courts of law in which tribal law may be applied. 159 The authority
149. Rebecca Tsosie, Native Americans and the Constitution: Tribalism,
Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil
Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 358 (2003) (The fact that Indian nations are not
guaranteed the rights afforded by the Bill of Rights has significant implications for female
members of certain tribes with regard to combatting discrimination).
150. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14 (Yale University 1987).
151. Resnik, supra note 11, at 697.
152. Resnik, supra note 11.
153. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
154. Worcester, supra note 144, at 515.
155. Id. at 519.
156. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 142, at 292-293.
157. Id. at 293.
158. Tsosie, supra note 149, at 358.
159. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 142, at 295-300 (The historical and legal
bases of contemporary Indian courts vary. A few courts existed before contact with
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of tribal courts over Reservation affairs was emphasized by Justice Black in
Williams v. Lee, 160 a milepost for Indian legal self-determination.1 6 1  In
response to a non-Indian disputing the authority of a tribal court, Black
noted that "[t]he cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority
of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress recognized this
authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever
since."
162
More than 200 federally recognized tribes have a type of judicial
system that qualifies as a "court.' '163 These courts apply Indian tribal law,
which, like most traditional law, recognizes custom as its source.
164
Indeed, not only is custom considered the source of law, it is even believed
to dominate written law in many disputes before tribal courts. 165  The
jurisdiction of tribal courts includes, inter alia, civil law, family law,
regulations, and minor crimes committed by Indians. In addition to
applying Indian law in specific areas, tribal jurisdiction has the scope to
develop Indian norms in these domains.' 66 Cases involving issues that fall
outside the jurisdiction of tribal courts are adjudicated by federal courts.
conquering forces, some were imposed after the conquest, and others were established
during the rebirth of sovereignty in this century).
160. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) Tribal courts developed from an
interaction between federal regulation and Indian tribal customs. Consequently, many
aspects of Indian tribal courts, e.g., tribal councils that influence tribal court decision
making and that may serve as appellate bodies and executive decisionmakers, are unfamiliar
to those schooled in U.S. court practices. Resnick, supra note 11, at 737.
161. Phillip Allen White, Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on
Good Roads, and You've Got Nothing to Worry About, " 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 65, 72
(1997).
162. Lee, 358 U.S. at 223.
163. Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the
Family, 79 NEB. L. REv. 577, 592.
164. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of
Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part II of II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509, 510
(Spring 1998).
165. The story of how Mrs. Correla became a judge illustrates this point. (The story
is based on an interview by Cooter and Fikentscher, Id.) She worked for several years as a
secretary in the Tohono O'odham tribal court where she gleaned some knowledge of law.
The Tohono O'odham tribal court consists of three judges appointed for two year terms. A
judge sometimes resigns before his term expires. One day a judge quit who was supposed
to decide a controversial case involving a stabbing. He said to Mrs. Correla, "You have
been around here longer than anyone else. You decide this case." So she did. After she
heard the arguments on both sides, she looked at the Tohono O'odha code, but did not find
it very helpful. She decided the case according to her own beliefs about right and wrong.
Mrs. Correla was subsequently appointed formally to the court, and she eventually became
its chief judge. Cooter and Fikentscher note that their interviews revealed that customs, like
that illustrated by the story of Mrs. Correla, are thriving in the practices of courts. This has
serious implications for those subject to tribal courts, particularly if they have no right to
appeal to a federal court.
166. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 164, at 509.
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3. Indian Tribal Law and Marriage in the United States
Indian tribal law is not unified and consequently, tribal law as it relates
to marriage also varies depending on the particular tribe in question.
67
Since many tribes do not have important traditional ceremonies for
marriage, they differ in determining what sort of conduct constitutes a
marriage.168 Despite the lack of consistency vis-A-vis Indian marriage laws,
the federal government generally recognizes Indian marriages that are
recognized by tribal authorities since marriage laws implicate cultural
values which are the domain of Indian tribes.169 Indeed, tribes tend to view
the regulation of family relations, including marriage, as central to tribal
sovereignty. 170  Consequently, American Indian customs that recognize
marriage through cohabitation are valid according to U.S. federal law even
if the marriage would otherwise be invalid under state law. 171
a. Establishment of a Marriage Contract
Indian families differ markedly from non-Indian families.
Accordingly, Indian family law, especially in terms of marriage, reflects
this difference. 72  While some Indian tribes have important traditional
ceremonies for marriage, many do not.'7 3 In fact, each tribal court has
different standards for determining whether a union between two people
has been accomplished according to custom. 174  Many Indians consider
people married when a man and woman begin living together publicly as a
couple. Thus a couple may be considered married in a matrilocal society
when the man goes to live with the woman's family, or vice versa in a
patrilocal society. Other tribes do not consider a union between two people
permanent until there is a long-term process of transferred rights and
167. Id. at 536.
168. Id. at 537-41 (Cooter and Fikentscher provide examples of different customs
relating to marriage. In many tribes, couples may be considered married when a man and
woman begin living together publicly. In the Zuni tribe, a marriage is held valid when
prayers to bless the union are held in Zuni. In Acoma, union prayers need only be spoken in
English. Navajo courts require a common law marriage to meet three criteria: consent,
cohabitation, and publicity.)
169. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (The federal government
recognizes that Indian tribes, as distinct, independent political communities, have the power
to regulate their internal and social relations. This includes making their own substantive
law in internal matters and the right to enforce that law in their own forums).
170. Atwood, supra note 163, at 582.
171. Lona N. Laymon, Note: Valid- Where-Consummated: The Intersection of
Customary Law Marriages and Formal Adjudication, 10 S. CAL. INTERDiSc. L.J. 353, 374
(Spring 2001), noting that 25 U.S.C. 371 (1999) validates the rights of heirs to a deceased
Native American to be recognized even if the individual was married or born from a
marriage that is only recognized in the Native American culture.
172. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 164, at 536.
173. See id. at 537-541 for an informative discussion of marriage among assorted
Indian tribes, based, in part, on field research.
174. Laymon, supra note 171, at 358.
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obligations. 175 While the formalities for entering into a marriage contract
vary or, in many instances, are nonexistent, once they are considered
married a couple faces significant legal consequences.
b. Rights in a Marriage
Just as individual tribes vary in terms of establishing marriage
contracts, so, too, do individual tribes apply their own distinct tribal law
with regard to the rights afforded spouses in a marriage. 176 Accordingly,
unlike marriage rights under Shari'a in Egypt and customary law in South
Africa, marriage rights under Indian tribal law do not constitute a coherent,
uniform body of rights.
Despite the variation of marriage rights under Indian tribal law, the
import of tribal law in this regard is significant since it directly affects the
rights and status of Indian women. 177  In order to gain a clearer
understanding of the impact of marriage rights under Indian tribal law, this
essay will focus primarily on one tribe: the Santa Clara Pueblo. In
particular, the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez178 will be examined.
Santa Clara not only illustrates the discriminatory nature of tribal marriage
rights, presented in the guise of tribal membership rules, 179 but it also
reveals how the system of legal pluralism in the United States results in the
federal law's tacit support of such discrimination.' 80
Martinez,' 18  a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, and her
daughter' 82 "alleg[ed] that a Pueblo ordinance' 8 3 that denies tribal
175. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 164, at 537.
176. See, e.g., id at 536-541.
177. See generally Francine R. Skenandore, Revisiting Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez. Feminist Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17 WIs. WOMEN's L.J. 347 (2000).
Skenandore discusses the contrary perspectives of Indian feminists and mainstream
feminists with regard to tribal sovereignty vis-A-vis equal rights. A tribe's right to make its
own laws and enforce them against its members, without regard to whether an external
authority considers those decisions wise, has allowed for a greater focus on tribal identity
rather than gender equality. This, in turn, has resulted in gender discrimination against
women exercised under the guise of tribal tradition and custom.
178. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49.
179. While Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez is generally described as a case about
tribal membership, it is important to note that the right to tribal membership emanates
directly from marriage rights. Consequently, this case will be discussed from the viewpoint
of marriage rights.
180. Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native American
Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 174 (1991)
(Since Congress did not specifically include the remedy of judicial review for civil actions,
federal courts have no right to interfere with the tribes' internal and social relationships.
Consequently, by denying Martinez judicial review of her case, the Court, effectively,
sanctioned a tribal marriage law that discriminates against women).
18 1. Respondent Julia Martinez was certified to represent a class consisting of all
women who are members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and have married men who are not
members of the Pueblo. Martinez v. Romney, 402 F. Supp. 5, 12 (D. N.M. 1975).
182. Respondent's daughter, Audrey Martinez, was certified as the class
representative of all children born to marriages between Santa Claran women and men who
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membership to the children of female members who marry outside the
tribe, but not to similarly situated children of men of that tribe, violate[d]
Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).' ' 184  Martinez
claimed that this rule discriminates on the basis of both sex and ancestry in
violation of Title I of the ICRA, which provides in relevant part that "[no]
Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." '185
Martinez is a full-blooded member of the Santa Clara Pueblo and
resides on the Santa Clara Reservation in northern New Mexico. In 1941
she married a Navajo Indian with whom she had several children. Two
years before this marriage, 116 the Pueblo passed a membership ordinance
barring admission of the Martinez children to the tribe because their father
was not a Santa Claran.187 The children were raised on the reservation,
speaking the Tewa language, and were, culturally and for all practical
are not members of the Pueblo. Id.
183. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 53 (The ordinance, enacted by the Santa Clara Pueblo
Council pursuant to its legislative authority under the Constitution of the Pueblo, established
a rule that "[children] born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo" while "[c]hildren born of
marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members shall not
be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo."); Leila Reem, Their Mother's Country, AL-AHRAM
WEEKLY ONLINE, Jan. 2002, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/568/li5.htm (Egypt, as well,
has a similar rule. Nationality law 26/1975 in Egypt grants automatic citizenship to children
born of Egyptian men and their non-Egyptian wives, while Egyptian women married to
foreigners are precluded from passing on their nationality to their children, or anyone else
for that matter).
184. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49; ICRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303; "The Indian Civil
Rights Act represents a congressional decision to limit Native American sovereignty by
setting forth an Indian Bill of Rights that applies to Native American tribes. It is Congress'
effort to protect individuals from tribal abuses. By designing a special Indian Bill of Rights,
Congress recognized that Native American tribes were distinct sovereigns, but it placed
limits on how they could exercise such sovereignty." While the ICRA is substantially
similar to the federal Bill of Rights, it is unlike the Bill of Rights in one important aspect:
the ICRA gives tribal courts, as opposed to federal courts, the authority to determine
whether rights have been violated. The Court in Martinez emphasized this authority when it
stated that "providing a federal forum for issues arising under § 1302 constitutes an
interference with tribal autonomy and self-government..."; see Christofferson, supra note
180 (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59).
185. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (8) (2000).
186. It is significant to note that between 1935 (when the Santa Clara Pueblo was
organized under the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat 984 (1934)), and
1939, tribal membership was extended to, among others, all "children of mixed marriages
between members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and nonmembers, provided such children have
been recognized and adopted by the council. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 705 (citing
Constitution and Bylaws of the Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico, approved Dec. 20,
1935, reprinted in Supreme Court Brief of the Petitioners, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
No. 76-682, Appendix at 1-2 (Oct Term, 1976) ("Petitioners' Brief")). Since the
membership rights of children from these mixed marriages were heretofore recognized and
only later extinguished in 1939, the role of custom as the purported basis for tribal law must
be questioned.
187. Martinez. 436 U.S. at 52-53.
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purposes, Santa Claran Indians.' 88 At the time of the lawsuit, the Martinez
children continued to reside on the Pueblo as adults.'
8 9
Like Martinez, Indian women who are discriminated against because of
gender-biased tribal laws concerning marriage and its affiliated tribal
membership rights suffer both financially and psychologically. In many
instances, these women no longer receive federal Indian benefits, such as
annuities from the tribe, access to education and health programs, and
housing.' 90 They also suffer from a loss of cultural identity, since by
marrying outside of their tribe they often lose their right to live on the
reservation with family and friends. 191
For Santa Claran women the discrimination they face because of
gender-biased tribal membership rules based on marriage extends to their
children as well. For instance, as a result of their exclusion from tribal
membership, for instance, Martinez's children may not vote in tribal
elections or hold secular office in the tribe.' 92 Moreover, they have no right
to remain on the reservation in the event of their mother's death, or to
inherit their mother's home or her possessory interests in the communal
lands. 193 These consequences also cause adverse psychological effects to
nonrecognized children. Indian women's loss of the right to "pass their
band membership to their children... [is] very harmful to the children's
sense of identity .... [Children] cannot easily endure the rejection of their
identity by an entire band."'
' 94
Not only does the Santa Claran law concerning tribal membership deny
women and their children assorted rights as tribe members, but it also
violates the equal protection guarantee of the ICRA. Section 1302 (8) of
the ICRA states: "No Indian tribe in exercising its powers of self-
government shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without
due process of law."' 95 Despite the gender-discriminatory nature of the
Santa Clara Pueblo's membership rules as they relate to marriage, the
Supreme Court determined that "providing a federal forum for issues
arising under section 1302 constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy
and self-government ..." 9 6 and "may 'undermine the authority of the tribal
[court] ... and hence... infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
188. Martinez v. Romney, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18 (1975).
189. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52.
190. Christofferson, supra note 180, at 169.
191. Id. at 184.
192. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52.
193. Id. at 52-53.
194. Christofferson, supra note 180, at 184 (quoting Pam Paul, Report prepared for
the Native Women's Association of Canada (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author)). See Christofferson at note 10 (the practice of denying women the right to live on
the reservation also occurs in the United States).
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (8) (2000).
196. Martinez. 436 U.S. at 59.
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themselves." ' 197  Consequently, the Court applied an exclusive forum
doctrine whereby federal courts were to defer to the tribal courts'
adjudication in civil matters.1 98  In essence, the Court concluded that
federal courts could not hear Martinez's discrimination claim since "the
ICRA was generally understood to authorize federal judicial review of
tribal actions only through the habeas corpus provisions of [the ICRA]."' 99
Despite the fact that "a central purpose of the ICRA and in particular of
Title I was to 'secur[e] for the American Indian the broad constitutional
rights afforded to other Americans,' and thereby 'protect individual Indians
from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments,' 200 Indian women
were left a right without a remedy as a result of Santa Clara.
201
The consequences of this ruling have left Indian women virtually
paralyzed within a system that subordinates women.2 °2 Although they hold
simultaneous membership in two political entities, an Indian tribe and the
United States, each of which affords equal protection of the law,203 Indian
women are denied this right by both entities. As a result, they remain
subject to discriminatory laws that rob them and their children of their
cultural identity as well as material benefits such as land use rights and
federal health and housing assistance.20 4
c. Polygamy
Traditionally, many Indian tribes allowed a man to have more than one
wife. In some circumstances, a man was encouraged or required to marry
sisters. This occurred, for example, when the husband of a wife's sister
died. In this instance, tribes encouraged a man to marry his wife's
widowed sister. In other tribes, sisters could demand that a man who
married one of them should marry the others so they could continue living
together.20 5 Despite the traditional practice of polygamy among some
tribes, today tribal courts do not recognize polygamous marriages.20 6
While Indian women are in many respects equal to men, e.g., they have
the right to decide whether to enter into a marriage contract and are, like
men, obliged to comply with the official prohibition against polygamous
marriages, they are discriminated against with regard to Indian law that
favors men over women with respect to tribal membership. By increasing
197. Id.
198. Christofferson, supra note 180, at 173.
199. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 70.
200. Id. at 61, quoting S. REP. No. 841, 5-6 (1967).
201. Christofferson, supra note 180, at 174.
202. Id. at 169.
203. According to the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, all Indians are United States
citizens. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 674.
204. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 721; see also Christofferson, supra note 180, at
184.
205. Id. at 539-40.
206. Id. at 540.
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Indian women's economic vulnerability, denying them their property rights
(since they are precluded from legally bequeathing property to their
children) and robbing their children of the right to official recognition of
their Indian heritage as well as their cultural identity, this sort of law
reflects an obvious gender bias against women. Moreover, the lack of
federal judicial review in Santa Clara effectively denies Indian women
their constitutional right to equal treatment. Despite the relative equality of
women and men under Indian law, the effect of the Santa Clara ruling
significantly weakens Indian women's status by implicitly condoning
Indian tribal law that fails to afford women the same rights, both tribal and
federal, as men.
III. CONCLUSION
Legal pluralism seeks to satisfy and incorporate the world view of
assorted segments of society, in particular, traditionally marginalized
cultural communities, by permitting the use of diverse, and often
conflicting bodies of law. While dual legal systems may be seen as
protecting a cultural minority in the case of the United States, reflecting
cultural diversity in South Africa, or endorsing fundamental religious
beliefs in Egypt, they also allow for the systematic maltreatment of women.
By discriminating against women, traditional law generates assorted
injustices. It not only explicitly infringes on the rights of women, but also
serves to diminish women's overall status by treating them as less than
men. Moreover, many of the implicit notions underpinning traditional law,
such as the dominance of patriarchy, make it susceptible to further breaches
of women's rights.
While various inequities flow from traditional law, this body of law
nevertheless serves an important function in society. In South Africa, for
instance, traditional law guides a large proportion of the population that has
little knowledge or understanding of national law, making it the only
source of law for many. In Egypt, the principles of traditional law serve as
the basis for all law and consequently influence society as a whole.
Traditional law in the United States is not as far-reaching as that in South
Africa and Egypt since it directly applies to only one segment of the
population: Indians. Nevertheless, this body of law is significant in that it
purportedly protects the sovereignty and cultural integrity of Indians and,
more importantly, governs Indians' internal matters without for the most
part being subject to the judicial review of federal courts.
Since traditional law is an integral and valuable element of many
legally pluralistic societies, it need not be wholly renounced because of its
discriminatory aspects. Rather, traditional law can and should be applied
so long as it meets recognized international human rights standards. This
would allow traditional law to satisfy the particular needs, preferences, and
beliefs of distinct populations while simultaneously ensuring that women
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are treated as equally and fairly as men. On the other hand, specific
traditional laws that discriminate against women, either directly or
indirectly, should be prohibited.
In this regard, countries with dual legal systems that include traditional
law would be well-served in noting South Africa's handling of
this situation. By unambiguously recognizing the supremacy of the
Constitution - both in terms of the rights it guarantees, e.g., the right to be
treated equally before the law and be afforded equal protection of the law,
as well as the values it promotes, e.g., human dignity, the achievement of
equality, and nonsexism - South Africa makes a laudable attempt to
protect women from discrimination. While not flawless, compared to
Egypt and the United States, the South African system of legal pluralism
more effectively protects women from bias in traditional law by subjecting
this body of law to the Constitution. Accordingly, traditional law must
comport with the Constitution's underlying ideals as well as the values
inherent in the Bill of Rights. In this way, the status of women under
traditional law is brought into line with the constitutional equality
provision.
It is evident that traditional law in its myriad forms discriminates
against women based on biological characteristics as well as social and
cultural stereotypes. It is also apparent that this type of law is an integral
element of many societies and their legal structures and therefore not likely
to be abandoned. Consequently, in order to protect women's rights and
thereby afford them a status on par with men, only traditional law that
reflects international human rights norms and international standards for
equality between men and women should be retained. Traditional law that
does not accord with such standards should either be modified accordingly
or done away with.
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